Precise Propagation of Upper and Lower Probability Bounds in System P by Gilio, Angelo
ar
X
iv
:m
at
h/
00
03
04
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
7 M
ar 
20
00
Precise Propagation of Upper and Lower Probability Bounds in
System P
Angelo Gilio
Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica, Citta` Universitaria
Viale A. Doria, 6 - 95125 Catania (Italy).
e-mail: gilio@dmi.unict.it
Abstract
In this paper we consider the inference rules of
System P in the framework of coherent impre-
cise probabilistic assessments. Exploiting our al-
gorithms, we propagate the lower and upper prob-
ability bounds associated with the conditional as-
sertions of a given knowledge base, automatically
obtaining the precise probability bounds for the
derived conclusions of the inference rules. This
allows a more flexible and realistic use of System
P in default reasoning and provides an exact illus-
tration of the degradation of the inference rules
when interpreted in probabilistic terms. We also
examine the disjunctive Weak Rational Monotony
of System P+ proposed by Adams in his extended
probability logic.
Keywords: Nonmonotonic reasoning, System P,
Conditional probability bounds, Precise propagation,
Coherence.
Introduction
In the applications of intelligent systems to automated
uncertain reasoning the explicit knowledge of the agent
is represented by a knowledge base K, constituted by
a set of conditional assertions (i.e. defaults). The non-
monotonic inferential process is developed using a suit-
able set of rules. Among the many formalisms which
have been proposed for default reasoning, the so-called
System P developed in (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor
1990) is widely accepted and has a probabilistic seman-
tics based on infinitesimal probabilities, see (Adams
1975, Pearl 1988). An extended probability logic has
been proposed in (Adams 1986) by allowing disjunc-
tion of conditionals. The corresponding system P+ has
been studied in (Schurz 1998) where the perspectives
of the infinitesimal probability semantics and that of
a noninfinitesimal one, based on probabilistic inequal-
ity relations, have been unified. In (Hawthorne 1996)
many logics of nonmonotonic conditionals, that behave
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like conditional probabilities at various levels of prob-
abilistic support, have been examined. In the quoted
paper the author shows that, for each given conditional
→, there is a probabilistic support level r and a condi-
tional probability P such that, for all sentences B,A,
it is B → A only if P (A|B) ≥ r. We recall that an
early examination of Adams rules by means of impre-
cise probabilities has been given in (Dubois, and Prade
1991). In the quoted paper a semantic interpretation in
terms of intervals has been given for the relations of neg-
ligibility, closeness and comparability examined in the
system of qualitative reasoning proposed in (Raiman
1986). Moreover, an application to the inference rules
of Adams has been given interpreting ”P (A|B) is large”
by means of the relation of closeness to 1 (making the
infinitesimal parameter ǫ explicit). In this way a quan-
tification of the degradation of the validity of Adams’
rules when reasoning with noninfinitesimal probabili-
ties has been obtained. While in practical applica-
tions the semantics of infinitesimal probabilities may
involve some difficulties, the approach based on lower
(and possibly upper) probability bounds, proposed also
in (Bourne, and Parsons 1998), is clearly more flexible
and realistic. In this paper the propagation of probabil-
ity bounds to the conditional assertions associated with
the rules of System P is examined in the framework of
the de Finetti’s probabilistic methodology, based on the
coherence principle. Notice that a coherent set of con-
ditional probability assessments satisfies all the usual
properties of conditional probabilities. A short exam-
ination of the logic of conditionals of Adams from the
point of view of coherence has been given in (Gilio
1997), where the propagation of probabilistic bounds
has not been considered. We point out that the pecu-
liarity of our approach is given by the possibility of look-
ing at the conditional probability P (A|B) as a primitive
concept,with no need of assuming that the probability
of the conditioning event B be positive. On the con-
trary, in the probabilistic approaches usually adopted
in the literature, see, e.g., (Adams 1975, Hawthorne
1996, Schurz 1998), by definition the quantity P (A|B)
is the ratio of P (AB) and P (B) if P (B) 6= 0, with
P (A|B) = 1 if P (B) = 0. Notice that a clear rationale
of this latter assumption does not seem to exist. Indeed,
in the framework of coherence, this assumption is not
made and the case of conditioning events of zero proba-
bility is managed without any problem: as an example,
the condition P (A|B)+P (Ac|B) = 1, where Ac denotes
the negation of A, is satisfied also when P (B) = 0. We
think that the opportunity, offered by the probabilis-
tic approach based on coherence, of developing a com-
pletely general treatment of probabilistic default rea-
soning is important specially in the field of nonmono-
tonic reasoning where infinitesimal probabilities play a
significant role. Moreover, exploiting the algorithms de-
veloped in our framework, the lower and upper proba-
bility bounds associated with the conditional assertions
of a given knowledge base can be propagated to further
conditional assertions, obtaining in all cases the tight-
est probability bounds. Beside allowing a more flexible
and realistic approach to probabilistic default reason-
ing, this provides an exact illustration of the degrada-
tion of System P rules when interpreted in probabilis-
tic terms. The probabilistic approach based on coher-
ence has been adopted in many recent papers, see, e.
g., (Biazzo, and Gilio 1999), (Capotorti, and Vantaggi
1999), (Coletti 1994), (Coletti, and Scozzafava 1996),
(Coletti, and Scozzafava 1999), (Gilio 1995a), (Gilio
1995b), (Gilio 1999), (Gilio, and Ingrassia 1998), (Gilio,
and Scozzafava 1994), (Lad 1999), (Lad, Dickey, and
Rahman 1990), (Scozzafava 1994). The algorithms de-
scribed in (Biazzo, and Gilio 1999), based on the linear
programming technique, have been implemented with
Maple V. The paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we give some preliminary concepts on coherence and
probability logic. In Section 3 we consider the defini-
tions of probabilistic consistency and entailment given
by Adams; then we recall the main inference rules of his
probability logic. In Section 4 we consider the propa-
gation of lower and upper probability bounds in Sys-
tem P. We also examine the disjunctive Weak Rational
Monotony of System P+. In Section 5 we examine the
propagation of lower bounds with real ǫ−values. Then,
in Section 6 we apply the results to (a slightly modified
version of) an example given in (Bourne, and Parsons
1998). Finally, in Section 7 we give some conclusions.
Some preliminaries
We recall some preliminary concepts on coherence of
imprecise probability assessments and on probability
logic. Given a family Fn = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn} and a
vector An = (α1, . . . , αn) of lower bounds P (Ei|Hi) ≥
αi, with i ∈ Jn = {1, . . . , n}, we consider the following
definition of generalized coherence (g-coherence), given
in (Biazzo, and Gilio 1999), which essentially coincides
with a previous one introduced in (Gilio 1995a).
Definition 1 The vector of lower bounds An on Fn
is said g-coherent if and only if there exists a precise
coherent assessment Pn = (p1, . . . , pn) on Fn, with pi =
P (Ei|Hi), which is consistent with An, that is such that
pi ≥ αi for each i ∈ Jn.
The Definition 1 can be also applied to imprecise as-
sessments like
αi ≤ P (Ei|Hi) ≤ βi , i ∈ Jn,
since each inequality P (Ei|Hi) ≤ βi amounts to the
inequality P (Eci |Hi) ≥ 1− βi.
Then, given an imprecise assessmentAn = (α1, . . . , αn)
on Fn, a suitable procedure, given in (Gilio 1995b),
can be used to check the g-coherence of An. The g-
coherent extension of An to a further conditional event
En+1|Hn+1 has been studied in (Biazzo, and Gilio 1999)
where, defining a suitable interval [p◦, p
◦] ⊆ [0, 1], the
following result has been obtained.
Theorem 1 Given a g-coherent imprecise assessment
An = ([αi, βi], i ∈ Jn) on the family Fn = {Ei|Hi, i ∈
Jn}, the extension [αn+1, βn+1] of An to a further con-
ditional event En+1|Hn+1 is g-coherent if and only if
the following condition is satisfied
[αn+1, βn+1] ∩ [p◦, p
◦] 6= ∅ . (1)
In the quoted paper an algorithm has been proposed to
determine [p◦, p
◦]. Moreover, starting with a g-coherent
assessment An, by the same algorithm it is possible to
determine the corresponding assessment A∗n coherent
wrt definition given in (Walley 1991).
We can frame our approach to the problem of prop-
agating imprecise conditional probability assessments
(probabilistic deduction) from the probability logic point
of view, see, e. g., (Frisch, and Haddawy 1994),
(Lukasiewicz 1998), (Nilsson 1986).
We associate to each conditional assertionH |∼ E in the
knowledge base K a probability interval [α, β]. In par-
ticular, given a family Fn of n conditional assertions,
we consider an interval-valued probability assessment
An = ([αi, βi], i = 1, . . . , n). Then, we can look at the
pair (Fn,An) as a probabilistic knowledge base, where
each imprecise assessment αi ≤ P (Ei|Hi) ≤ βi is a
probabilistic formula denoted by (Ei|Hi)[αi, βi]. In our
approach a probabilistic interpretation is just a coher-
ent precise conditional probability assessment Pn on
Fn. A probabilistic interpretation Pn = (p1, . . . , pn)
is a model of a probabilistic formula (Ei|Hi)[αi, βi] iff
Pn |= (Ei|Hi)[αi, βi], that is αi ≤ pi ≤ βi. Pn
is a model of the probabilistic knowledge base K =
(Fn,An), denoted Pn |= K, iff Pn |= (E|H)[α, β] for
every (E|H)[α, β] ∈ K. Therefore, Pn is a model of
K = (Fn,An) iff Pn is consistent with An. A set of
probabilistic formulas K is satisfiable iff a model of K
exists, therefore the concept of satisfiability of K =
(Fn,An) coincides with that of g-coherence of An on
Fn. A probabilistic formula (En+1|Hn+1)[αn+1, βn+1]
is a logical consequence of K = (Fn,An), denoted
K |= (En+1|Hn+1)[αn+1, βn+1], iff
αn+1 ≤ inf I , βn+1 ≥ sup I ,
where I is the set of the real values p such that there
exists a model of K ∪ {(En+1|Hn+1)[p, p]}. As shown
by the condition (1), in our approach this amounts to
[p◦, p
◦] ⊆ [αn+1, βn+1].
A probabilistic formula (En+1|Hn+1)[αn+1, βn+1] is a
tight logical consequence of K = (Fn,An), denoted
K |=tight (En+1|Hn+1)[αn+1, βn+1], iff
αn+1 = inf I , βn+1 = sup I ,
that is
αn+1 = p◦ , βn+1 = p
◦ .
Considering a probabilistic query (En+1|Hn+1)[α, β],
where α and β are two different variables, to a prob-
abilistic knowledge base K = (Fn,An) a correct an-
swer is any [α, β] = [αn+1, βn+1] ⊇ [p◦, p
◦], that is such
that K |= (En+1|Hn+1)[αn+1, βn+1]. The tight answer
is [α, β] = [p◦, p
◦].
Probabilistic consistency and entailment
We recall that in (Adams 1975) the conditional asser-
tion ”ifA thenB ” is looked at as P (B|A) ≥ 1−ǫ (∀ǫ >
0). Adopting a more realistic point of view we may
look at the same conditional assertion as the proba-
bilistic formula (B|A)[α, β], with 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1, where
usually β = 1. Then, a (probabilistic) knowledge base
might be defined as a family of probabilistic formulas
K = {(E|H)[α, β]}. In (Adams 1975) the following def-
inition has been given.
Definition 2 The knowledge base K is probabilistically
consistent (p-consistent) if, for every ǫ > 0, there exists
a probability P on A, proper forK, such that P (E|H) ≥
1− ǫ for every E|H ∈ K .
In our framework the concept of probabilistic consis-
tency can be defined in the following way.
Definition 3 The knowledge base K is probabilistically
consistent (p-consistent) if, for every set of lower bounds
A = {αE|H , E|H ∈ K} on K, there exists a precise
coherent probability assessment P = {pE|H , E|H ∈ K}
on K, with pE|H = P (E|H), such that, for each E|H ∈
K, pE|H ≥ αE|H .
We recall the concept of probabilistic entailment as
defined in (Adams 1975).
Definition 4 A p-consistent knowledge base K proba-
bilistically entails (p-entails) the conditional B|A if, for
every ǫ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for all proba-
bilities P , proper for K∪ {B|A}, if P (E|H) ≥ 1− δ for
each E|H ∈ K, then P (B|A) ≥ 1− ǫ.
In our framework the concept of probabilistic entail-
ment can be defined in the following way.
Definition 5 A p-consistent knowledge base K proba-
bilistically entails the conditional B|A if there exists a
subfamily F ⊆ K such that, for every αB|A, there ex-
ists a set of lower bounds A = {αE|H , E|H ∈ F} on
F such that for all precise coherent probability assess-
ment P = {pB|A, pE|H , E|H ∈ F} on F ∪ {B|A}, with
pB|A = P (B|A), pE|H = P (E|H), if pE|H ≥ αE|H for
each E|H ∈ F , then pB|A ≥ αB|A.
The probabilistic entailment of B|A by K is denoted
by the symbol K ⇒ B|A. In (Adams 1975) a suitable
set R of seven inference rules has been introduced, by
means of which an inferential system can be developed
to deduce in an automatic way all the plausible conclu-
sions of a knowledge base K.See also (Pearl 1988). The
fundamental rules of the set R are the following ones:
R1. A |∼ C , A |∼ B ⇒ AB |∼ C
(Triangularity)
R2. AB |∼ C , A |∼ B ⇒ A |∼ C
(Bayes)
R3 A |∼ C , B |∼ C ⇒ A ∨B |∼ C
(Disjunction)
The previous rules, among others, have been used (with
different names and in the framework of symbolic ap-
proaches too) by many authors, with the aim of devel-
oping some nonmonotonic logics to formalize the plau-
sible reasoning (see e.g. (Kraus, Lehmann, and Magi-
dor 1990), (Lehmann, and Magidor 1992), (Dubois, and
Prade 1994)). See also the survey given in (Benferhat,
Dubois, and Prade 1997).
We recall that in (Gilio 1997) the following concept of
strict probabilistic consistency has been introduced.
Definition 6 The knowledge base K is strictly p-
consistent if the probability assessment P on K, such
that P (E|H) = 1 for each E|H ∈ K, is coherent.
Then the following result, which has some relations with
the Theorem 3 given in (Schurz 1998), has been given
(without proof).
Theorem 2 K is p-consistent if and only if K is strictly
p-consistent.
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the following three
assertions:
a. If K is strictly p-consistent, then K is p-consistent;
b. If K is p-consistent, then K is consistent;
c. If K is consistent, then K is strictly p-consistent.
Hence, the property of p-consistency can be simply de-
fined on the basis of the property of strict p-consistency.
Moreover, the following well known result
Theorem 3 If K is consistent, then K ⇒ B|A if and
only if K ∪ {Bc|A} is inconsistent.
can be reformulated in the following way:
Theorem 4 Given a consistent knowledge base K and
a conditional B|A, K p-entails B|A if and only if
the probability assessment P on K ∪ {Bc|A}, with
P (Bc|A) = P (E|H) = 1 for each E|H ∈ K, is not
coherent.
Exact propagation of probability bounds
in System P
We recall that the inference rules in System P are the
following ones:
1. A |∼ A
(Reflexivity)
2. |= A↔ B, A |∼ C =⇒ B |∼ C
(Left Logical Equivalence)
3. |= B → C, A |∼ B =⇒ A |∼ C
(Right Weakening)
4. A |∼ B, A |∼ C =⇒ A |∼ BC
(And)
5. A |∼ C, A |∼ B =⇒ AB |∼ C
(Cautious Monotonicity)
6. A |∼ C, B |∼ C =⇒ A ∨B |∼ C
(Or)
Two derived rules in System P are
7. AB |∼ C, A |∼ B =⇒ A |∼ C (Cut)
8. AB |∼ C =⇒ A |∼ B → C (S )
As we can see, the rules R1, R2, R3 coincide respec-
tively with the rules Cautious Monotonicity, Cut, Or in
System P. In (Adam86) an extended probability logic
(System P+) was developed by allowing the disjunc-
tion of conditionals in the conclusion of inferences and
by adding the following dWRM rule.
9. A |∼ C =⇒ A |∼ Bc ∨ AB |∼ C
(disjunctive Weak Rational Monotony)
Now we will show how the probability intervals asso-
ciated with the antecedents in each rule of System P
propagate in a precise way to the consequent of the
given rule. We will also examine the rules Cut, S and
dWRM. These bounds will provide an exact illustration
of the degradation of System P rules when interpreted
in probabilistic terms. Perhaps, as a by-product, also a
better appreciation of the results given in (Hawthorne
1996) on the interpretation of nonmonotonic condition-
als in terms of probabilistic support levels could be ob-
tained. We assume that the basic events A,B,C are
logically independent.
1. Reflexivity rule. As for every assertion A the assess-
ment P (A|A) = p is coherent if and only if p = 1,
to the conditional assertion A |∼ A we associate the
interval [α, β] = [1, 1].
2. Left Logical Equivalence rule. If two assertions A,B
are equivalent, then for every assertion C the assess-
ment (x, y) on the pair of conditional events C|A,C|B
is coherent if and only x = y. Therefore we associate
the same probability interval to the conditional asser-
tions C|A,C|B. In other words, the assessment [α, β]
on C|A propagates to the same interval on C|B.
3. Right Weakening rule. If B ⊆ C then, defining the
inclusion among conditional events as in (Goodman,
and Nguyen 1988), it is B|A ⊆ C|A and then the
assessment (x, y) on the pair of conditional events
B|A,C|A is coherent if and only x ≤ y, see (Gilio
1993). Therefore, the assessment [α, β] on B|A prop-
agates to the interval [α, 1] on C|A.
4. And rule. Given the assessment (x, y) on the pair
of conditional events B|A,C|A, as well known the
extension P (BC|A) = z is coherent if and only if
Max {0, x+ y − 1} = z′ ≤ z ≤ z′′ =Min {x, y}.
Therefore, the probability intervals [α1, β1], [α2, β2]
on the antecedents B|A,C|A of the rule propagate to
the exact interval [α3, β3], with
α3 =Min z
′ = Max {0, α1 + α2 − 1} ,
β3 = Max z
′′ =Min {β1, β2} ,
(2)
on the consequent BC|A.
5. Cautious Monotonicity rule. Given the assessment
(x, y) on the pair of conditional events C|A,B|A, as
proved in (Gilio 1995b), the extension P (C|AB) = z
is coherent if and only if z ∈ [z′, z′′], with
z′ =
{
x+y−1
y
, if x+ y > 1
0 , if x+ y ≤ 1
,
z′′ =
{
x
y
, if x < y
1 , if x ≥ y
.
We observe that, for (x, y) ∈ [α1, β1] × [α2, β2] the
function f(x, y) attains its minimum value at the
point (α1, α2). Then, it follows
α3 =
{
α1+α2−1
α2
, if α1 + α2 > 1
0, if α1 + α2 ≤ 1
(3)
Moreover, the function g(x, y) attains its maximum
value at the point (β1, α2). Then it follows
β3 =
{
β1
α2
, if β1 < α2
1, if β1 ≥ α2
(4)
Then, in order to determine the interval [α3, β3]
we have to consider the position of the vertices
(α1, α2), (β1, α2) wrt diagonals of the unitary square
[0, 1]2.
6. Or rule. Given the assessment (x, y) on the pair of
conditional events C|A,C|B, it can be proved that
the extension P (C|(A ∨ B)) = z is coherent if and
only if z ∈ [z′, z′′], with
z′ =
{ xy
x+y−xy , if (x, y) 6= (0, 0)
0, if (x, y) = (0, 0)
,
z′′ =
{
x+y−2xy
1−xy , if (x, y) 6= (1, 1)
1, if (x, y) = (1, 1)
.
Moreover, we observe that both z′ and z′′ increase
as either x or y increase. Therefore, the proba-
bility intervals [α1, β1], [α2, β2] on the antecedents
C|A,C|B of the rule propagate, under the condition
(α1, α2) 6= (0, 0), (β1, β2) 6= (1, 1), to [α3, β3], with
α3 =
α1α2
α1 + α2 − α1α2
, (5)
β3 =
β1 + β2 − 2β1β2
1− β1β2
, (6)
on the consequent C|(A ∨B).
Concerning the rules Cut and S we have the following
results.
(e) Cut rule. Given the assessment (x, y) on the pair
of conditional events C|AB,B|A, it can be proved that
the extension P (C|A) = z is coherent if and only if
xy ≤ z ≤ xy + 1− y .
Therefore, the probability intervals [α1, β1], [α2, β2] on
the antecedents C|AB,B|A of the rule propagate to
[α3, β3], with
α3 = α1α2 , β3 = β1α2 + 1− α2 , (7)
on the consequent C|A.
(f) S rule. As C|AB ⊆ (Bc∨C)|A, then the assessment
(x, y) on the conditional events C|AB, (Bc ∨ C)|A is
coherent if and only if x ≤ y. Therefore, the probability
interval [α1, β1] on the antecedent C|AB of the rule
propagates to [α2, β2], with
α2 = α1, β2 = 1 ,
on the consequent (Bc ∨ C)|A.
(g) dWRM rule. Let P = (x, y, z) a probability assess-
ment on the family {C|A,Bc|A,C|AB}. For this family
the constituents (possible worlds) are
C0 = A
c , C1 = ABC , C2 = ABC
c ,
C3 = AB
cC , C4 = AB
cCc .
To the constituents C1, . . . , C4 we associate the points
Q1 = (1, 0, 1) , Q2 = (0, 0, 0) ,
Q3 = (1, 1, z) , Q4 = (0, 1, z) .
Then, based on the method given in (Gilio 1995b) and
denoting by I the convex hull of the points Q1, . . . , Q4,
it can be proved that the coherence of P amounts
to the condition P ∈ I. Notice that in general this
condition is necessary but not sufficient for the coher-
ence of an assessment Pn = (p1, . . . , pn) on a family
Fn = {E1|H1, . . . , En|Hn}. The study of the condition
P ∈ I requires considering the equations of the four
planes determined respectively by the terns of points
{Q1, Q2, Q3} , {Q2, Q3, Q4} ,
{Q1, Q2, Q4} , {Q1, Q3, Q4} .
Denoting by X,Y, Z the axes’ coordinates, the equa-
tions are given respectively by
Z = X + (z − 1)Y , Z = zY ,
Z = X + zY , Z = (z − 1)Y + 1 .
Then, given the values x, y, it is
P ∈ I ⇐⇒ z′ ≤ z ≤ z′′ ,
where
z′ =
{
x−y
1−y , if x > y
0 , if x ≤ y
,
z′′ =
{
x
1−y , if x+ y < 1
1 , if x+ y ≥ 1
.
In order to examine the probabilistic interpretation of
the rule we introduce a partition {R1,R2,R3,R4} of
the unitary square [0, 1]2, with
R1 = {(x, y) : x+ y < 1, x ≥ y} ,
R2 = {(x, y) : x+ y < 1, x < y} ,
R3 = {(x, y) : x+ y ≥ 1, x < y} ,
R4 = {(x, y) : x+ y ≥ 1, x ≥ y} .
We have to examine the case in which x is ”high”, there-
fore R2 is not of interest. In R3, since x < y, if x
is ”high” then y is ”high” too. In R1 and R4 it is
z ≥ z′ = x−y1−y so that, if x is ”high” and y is ”not high”,
then z is ”high”.
Concerning propagation of probability intervals, if we
consider the assessments [α1, β1], [α2, β2] on the con-
ditional events C|A,Bc|A, then for the interval [α3, β3]
associated with C|AB we first observe that the quantity
x
1−y attains its maximum value at the point (β1, α2),
while the quantity x−y1−y attains its minimum value at
the point (α1, β2). Then, we have:
α3 =
{
α1−β2
1−β2
, if α1 ≥ β2
0, if α1 < β2
(8)
β3 =
{
β1
1−α2
, if β1 + α2 < 1
1, if β1 + α2 ≥ 1
(9)
Remark 1 Using the lower bounds computed previ-
ously, we can verify the probabilistic entailment in each
inference rule on the basis of Definition 5. We have
• And rule. For each given value α3, from (2) we have
that, for every (α1, α2) ∈ [α3, 1] × [α3, 1] such that
α1+α2 = 1+α3, if P (B|A) ≥ α1, P (C|A) ≥ α2 then
P (BC|A) ≥ α3.
• Cautious Monotonicity rule. For each given value α3,
from (3) we have that, for every (α1, α2) ∈ [α3, 1] ×
(0, 1] such that α1 + (1 − α3)α2 = 1, if P (C|A) ≥
α1, P (B|A) ≥ α2 then P (C|AB) ≥ α3.
• Or rule. For each given value α3, from (5) we have
that, for every (α1, α2) ∈ [α3, 1] × [α3, 1] such that
α2 =
α1α3
α1(1+α3)−α3
, if P (C|A) ≥ α1, P (C|B) ≥ α2
then P (C|A ∨B) ≥ α3.
• Cut rule. For each given value α3, from (7) we have
that for every (α1, α2) ∈ [α3, 1] × [α3, 1] such that
α2 =
α3
α1
, if P (C|AB) ≥ α1, P (B|A) ≥ α2 then
P (C|A) ≥ α3.
Propagation with ǫ−values
The results of the previous section can be examined in
the particular case in which for i = 1, 2 it is [αi, βi] =
[1− ǫi, 1]. As it can be verified, the ǫ−values propagate
in the following way.
• And rule. From ( 2), the probability bounds
[1 − ǫ1, 1], [1 − ǫ2, 1] on the antecedents B|A,C|A of
the rule propagate, on the consequent BC|A, to the
exact bounds [1− ǫ3, 1], with
ǫ3 = ǫ1 + ǫ2 (10)
• Cautious Monotonicity rule. From (3), the probabil-
ity intervals [1 − ǫ1, 1], [1 − ǫ2, 1] on the antecedents
C|A,B|A of the rule propagate, on the consequent
C|AB, to [1− ǫ3, 1], with
ǫ3 =
ǫ1
1− ǫ2
(11)
• Or rule. From ( 5), the probability intervals
[1 − ǫ1, 1], [1 − ǫ2, 1] on the antecedents C|A,C|B of
the rule propagate, on the consequent C|(A ∨B), to
[1− ǫ3, 1], with
ǫ3 =
ǫ1 + ǫ2 − 2ǫ1ǫ2
1− ǫ1ǫ2
(12)
• Cut rule. From ( 7), the probability intervals
[1 − ǫ1, 1], [1 − ǫ2, 1] on the antecedents C|AB,B|A
of the rule propagate, on the consequent C|A, to
[1− ǫ3, 1], with
ǫ3 = ǫ1 + ǫ2 − ǫ1ǫ2 (13)
Remark 2 Our results concerning the value of ǫ3 co-
incide with that ones obtained in (Bourne, and Parsons
1998) for the rules And and Cautious Monotonicity and
are better for the rules Or and Cut, as from (12) and
(13) one has respectively
ǫ3 =
ǫ1+ǫ2−2ǫ1ǫ2
1−ǫ1ǫ2
< ǫ1 + ǫ2 (ǫ1 < 1, ǫ2 < 1),
ǫ3 = ǫ1 + ǫ2 − ǫ1ǫ2 < ǫ1 + ǫ2 (ǫ1 > 0, ǫ2 > 0).
The use of the precise bounds may have some relevance
when the inference rules are applied with real ǫ−values.
An application
We will now examine an example to give an idea, on
one hand, of how much the conclusions may be sensible
to the use of methods of exact propagation of proba-
bility bounds and, on another hand, of the related phe-
nomenon of degradation of inference rules when inter-
preted in probabilistic terms. The example is a modified
version of an application considered in (Bourne, and
Parsons 1998) which was inspired by examples given in
(Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990). We consider a
probabilistic knowledge base consisting of some condi-
tional assertions, which concern the fact that a given
party has various attributes (the party is great, noisy,
Linda and Steve are present, and so on). By the sym-
bol A |∼ǫ B we denote the assessment P (B|A) ≥ 1− ǫ.
We start with a knowledge base which has the following
rules and ǫ−values:
1. Linda |∼0.05 great
2. Linda |∼0.2 Steve
3. Linda ∧ Steve |∼0.1 ¬noisy
4. Steve |∼0.05 Linda
5. ¬noisy |∼0.2 ¬great
Notice that the conditional ”Linda |∼0.05 great” means
that the probability of the conditional event
”(The party will be great | Linda goes to the party)”
is greater than or equal to 1− 0.05, and so on. We are
interested in propagating the previous bounds to find
the ǫ−values of the following conditionals:
(a) Linda |∼ǫ ¬noisy
(b) ⊤ |∼ǫ ¬Linda
(c) Linda ∧ Steve |∼ǫ great ∧ ¬noisy
(d) Steve |∼ǫ ¬noisy
(e) Linda ∨ Steve |∼ǫ ¬noisy
By the symbol ⊤ we denote (any tautology represent-
ing) the certain event.
Applying the Cut rule to the conditionals
Linda |∼0.2 Steve , Linda ∧ Steve |∼0.1 ¬noisy ,
we obtain the conditional
Linda |∼0.28 ¬noisy .
Then, applying the And rule to the conditionals
Linda |∼0.28 ¬noisy , Linda |∼0.05 great ,
we obtain the conditional
Linda |∼0.33 great ∧ ¬noisy .
Applying the S rule to
Linda |∼0.33 great ∧ ¬noisy
we obtain
⊤ |∼0.33 ¬Linda ∨ great ∧ ¬noisy .
Applying the S rule to
¬noisy |∼0.2 ¬great
we obtain
⊤ |∼0.2 noisy ∨ ¬great .
Finally, applying the And rule to the conditionals
⊤ |∼0.33 ¬Linda∨great∧¬noisy, ⊤ |∼0.2 noisy∨¬great,
we obtain the conditional
⊤ |∼0.53 ¬Linda ∧ (noisy ∨ ¬great).
Then, by the Right Weakening rule we have
⊤ |∼0.53 ¬Linda∧(noisy∨¬great) =⇒ ⊤ |∼0.53 ¬Linda.
Concerning the conditional (c), applying the Cautious
Monotonicity rule to
Linda |∼0.05 great , Linda |∼0.2 Steve ,
we obtain
Linda ∧ Steve |∼0.0625 great .
Then, applying the And rule to the conditionals
Linda∧Steve |∼0.0625 great, Linda∧Steve |∼0.1 ¬noisy,
we obtain the conditional
Linda ∧ Steve |∼0.0725 great ∧ ¬noisy .
Concerning the conditional (d), applying the Cut rule
to the conditionals
Linda ∧ Steve |∼0.1 ¬noisy , Steve |∼0.05 Linda ,
we obtain the conditional
Steve |∼0.145 ¬noisy (14)
Then, applying the Or rule to the conditionals
Steve|∼0.145 ¬noisy , Linda|∼0.28 ¬noisy ,
we obtain the conditional
Linda ∨ Steve|∼0.358 ¬noisy (15)
We observe that, propagating the bounds with ǫ3 =
ǫ1 + ǫ2, instead of the conditionals (14) and (15) we
would obtain respectively
Steve |∼0.15 ¬noisy ,
and
Linda ∨ Steve |∼0.425 ¬noisy .
Conclusions
In this paper the inference rules of System P have been
considered in the framework of coherence. We have also
examined the disjunctive Weak Rational Monotony pro-
posed by Adams in his extended probability logic, cor-
responding to System P+. Differently from the prob-
abilistic approaches generally given in the literature,
see, in particular, (Hawthorne 1996) and (Schurz 1998),
within our framework we can directly manage condi-
tional probability assessments, even if some (or possi-
bly all the) conditioning events have zero probability.
We think that this opportunity is important specially
in the field of nonmonotonic reasoning where infinites-
imal probabilities play a significant role. Moreover, ex-
ploiting our algorithms, the lower and upper probabil-
ity bounds associated with the conditional assertions of
a given knowledge base can be propagated to further
conditional assertions, obtaining in all cases the pre-
cise probability bounds. In particular, beside allowing
a more flexible and realistic approach to probabilistic
default reasoning, this provides an exact illustration of
the degradation of System P rules when interpreted in
probabilistic terms.
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